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MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE: WHAT MINORITY, WHOSE
RIGHTS?
David Schultz*
The Electoral College as a method of selecting U.S.
presidents was allegedly set up to protect one type of minority
rights—those of slave states and small states—but over time
it has operated to deny the rights of racial and other minorities,
especially given the winner-take-all system of electoral vote
allocation used in forty-eight states. This Essay examines the
history and current operation of the Electoral College, detailing
how, despite its changes, it continues to privilege some forms of
minority rights at the expense of others. The Essay also
indicates how in its current form in forty-eight states, the
Electoral College suppresses minority votes. Even though
Georgia in 2020 appeared to show rising political efficacy for
African American voters, the future of minority voting rights in
presidential elections is still in trouble if the Electoral College
in its present form continues to operate.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2020 presidential election results in Georgia represent a
watershed moment in American history. To the surprise of many,
when the votes were certified, Democratic nominee Joe Biden won
the state, defeating the Republican candidate, Donald Trump.1 It
was only the fifth time since 1960 that a Democrat had won
Georgia’s Electoral College votes.2 President Biden’s victory and the
flipping of two U.S. Senate seats from Republican to Democratic
control were driven to a large extent by African American voters.3
As a result, there were calls to change voting procedures and
requirements to make voting in Georgia more difficult.4 One such
proposal has already become law.5
Historically, it seems that the U.S. Constitution and voting laws
have been designed to deny people of color the right to vote and have
their voice heard when they were a demographic minority.6 Now

1 Kate Brumback, Georgia Officials Certify Election Results Showing Biden Win,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 20, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/georgia-certify-election-joebiden-ea8f867d740f3d7d42d0a55c1aef9e69.
2 Presidential Voting Trends in Georgia, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Presidential
_voting_trends_in_Georgia (last visited May 14, 2021); Number of Electoral Votes from
Georgia Designated to Each Party’s Candidate in U.S. Presidential Elections from 1789 to
2020, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/1130234/georgia-electoral-votes-since1789/ (last visited May 14, 2021).
3 See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Reis Thebault, Haisten Willis & Lenny Bronner, Black Voters
Powered Democrats to Victory in the Georgia Senate Runoff, WASH. POST (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:36
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/black-voters-powered-democrats-to-victory-in
-the-georgia-senate-runoff/2021/01/06/7068411a-502a-11eb-b96e-0e54447b23a1_story.html
(“Sky-high turnout among Black voters powered a pair of Democrats to Senate victories in
Georgia, reshaping the balance of power in Washington as President-elect Joe Biden takes
office.”).
4 See Nick Corasaniti & Jim Rutenberg, In Georgia, Republicans Take Aim at Role of Black
Churches in Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/us/
politics/churches-black-voters-georgia.html?smid=em-share (“Stung by losses in the
presidential race and two Senate contests, the state [Republican] party is moving quickly to
push through . . . measures aimed directly at suppressing the Black turnout that helped
Democrats prevail in the critical battleground state.”).
5 See Zack Beauchamp, Yes, the Georgia Election Law is That Bad, VOX (Apr. 6, 2021, 1:30
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22368044/georgia-sb202-voter-suppressiondemocracy-big-lie (discussing S.B. 202 and its effects on Georgia’s election procedures).
6 See generally ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING
RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015) (discussing the history of voter suppression after the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965); DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., THE RIGHT TO VOTE: RIGHTS
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that people of color are part of an emerging electoral majority, those
same laws may be changing to protect a White minority.
This Essay looks at the role of minority rights in the Electoral
College and argues that the institution has always concerned itself
with race and minority votes. Specifically, two basic truths define
the Electoral College’s existence. One, the Electoral College has
always been associated with anti-majoritarianism and minority
rights.7 Yet, the institution has inconsistently defined which
minority and whose rights must be protected versus which must be
oppressed.8 Two, it is an institution born of slavery and racism, and
it continues to perpetuate racism today.9 From its origins in the
great compromises of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and up
until today, the Electoral College has more often than not restricted
the rights of people of color, while enabling the rights of a different
minority.10

II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
Classic democratic theory states that the people should select
their leaders, including their president and other major
officeholders.11 A representative democracy is one where the people
ultimately rule through the individuals they elect.12 The United
States, though, is unique in how it selects its president. Rather than

AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW (2004) (examining how political groups selectively expand
and constrict the franchise to preserve their political power).
7 See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN NO MAJORITY RULES: THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE AND PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1992) (contending that the Electoral College is
anti-democratic and fails to protect certain minority rights).
8 See generally Lawrence D. Longley & James D. Dana, Jr., New Empirical Estimates of
the Biases of the Electoral College for the 1980s, 37 W. POL. Q. 157 (1984) (describing the
changing biases in the structure of the Electoral College over time).
9 See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L. REV.
1145, 1156 (2002) (describing the Electoral College as “the last constitutional vestige” of
slavery).
10 See, e.g., id. at 1147 (discussing how the Electoral College enabled the rights of minority
slaveholder interests).
11 See DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 51–52 (2014) (describing
as a “requisite” of democracy the power of the people “to make the choices over who the elected
leaders are”); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 112–15 (1989) (explaining that
the people’s “control of the agenda” is essential to a “fully democratic process”).
12 Cf. SCHULTZ, supra note 11, at 137–40 (discussing how democratic theorists have
described and debated the concept of “representation”).
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employing a direct popular vote, the Framers opted for the Electoral
College, as described in Article II of the U.S. Constitution and the
Twelfth Amendment.13
At the Constitutional Convention of 1787—as Robert Dahl14 and
others15 have pointed out—fear of power, especially when exercised
or abused by a majority, was the primary focus of constitutional
design.16 In fact, James Madison, in Federalist No. 10, describes one
of the chief tasks of constitutional design as avoiding the problem of
majority factions who could oppress the rights of others or the
“permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”17 Madison
was defending the interests of the minority against the majority,
but who constituted the minority is a matter of contest, with some
arguing that it was affluent slaveholders.18
Yet the Constitutional Convention of 1787 was also about
compromises.19 Historian Richard Hofstadter points to the fact that
the Framers were political realists and politicians, challenged by
13 See Finkelman, supra note 9, at 1146 (describing the Electoral College as a “unique”
system that only exists in the context of presidential elections in the United States).
14 See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4–8 (1956) (outlining
Madisonian democratic theory).
15 See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 3 (1994) (“For Madison, majority tyranny represented the
great danger to our early constitutional democracy.”). See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975).
16 See 1 ALFRED H. KELLY, WINFRED A. HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 82–85 (7th ed. 1991) (discussing the need for
checks and balances to restrict legislative power); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD
OF LIBERTY 15–17 (1981) (outlining the concerns of George Washington and John Adams);
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 472–75 (1969)
(explaining James Madison’s fear that “interested majorities” in individual states would
suppress minority rights without a strong federal government); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at
60–61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (“When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion
or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good,
and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the
spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are
directed . . . .”).
17 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 16, at 57 (James Madison).
18 See Finkelman, supra note 9, at 1155 (discussing the slaveholding interests in the
Electoral College).
19 See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE MEN WHO
MADE IT 3–17 (1973) (discussing the many interests the Framers balanced when crafting the
U.S. Constitution).
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the need to forge compromise among diverse interests.20 The
Constitutional Convention was marked by disputes between the
more populous and less populous states over the issue of
representation.21 Those disputes were made more challenging by
the divide over slavery.22 Free and slave states feared that,
depending on the representation schema selected for Congress, the
other side would prevail and that there would be a United States of
all slave states or all free states.23 The South, possessing the vast
majority of slaves, would have had a clear advantage if slaves were
counted for the purpose of representation.24
The tension surrounding slavery precipitated a series of fights
that ultimately impacted the procedure for presidential selection.
First, it influenced how representation in Congress was
determined.25 This was a twofold question: one concerned the states,
while the other related to individuals. In terms of the states, the
question revolved around how representation would be allocated in
Congress. Under the Articles of Confederation, each state had equal

20 See id. at 3–9 (discussing the political and ideological backgrounds of the Framers and
how that informed their ability to compromise).
21 See, e.g., 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 90–91 (comparing the Virginia and New Jersey
Plans); 1 DUMAS MALONE & BASIL RAUCH, EMPIRE FOR LIBERTY: THE GENESIS AND GROWTH
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 227–36 (1960) (discussing the debate between large and
small states about the proper form of representation in Congress).
22 See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION
GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 13–14 (2006) (noting the
compromises that the Framers made regarding slavery in order to create “the political union
of the thirteen states”); 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 93–96 (explaining the Great
Compromise); MALONE & RAUCH, supra note 21, at 235–37 (discussing how the three-fifths
rule benefited slave states and increased their representation in Congress).
23 See Paul Finkelman, The Founders and Slavery: Little Ventured, Little Gained, 13 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 413, 414–15 (2001) (noting that the Framers “gave the slave owners at the
Convention virtually everything they asked for”).
24 See
Kathryn
L.
Mackay,
Statistics
on
Slavery,
WEBER ST. UNIV.,
https://faculty.weber.edu/kmackay/statistics_on_slavery.htm (last visited May 18, 2021)
(illustrating how much of the population of southern states was comprised of enslaved
individuals); Free and Slave Populations by State (1790), TEACHING AM. HIST.,
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/resources/the-constitutional-convention-free-and-slavepopulations-by-state-1790/ (last visited May 18, 2021) (showing the vast difference between
the states in terms of enslaved populations in 1790).
25 See JOHN R. VILE, THE WRITING AND RATIFICATION OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION:
PRACTICAL VIRTUE IN ACTION 82–87 (2012) (detailing the debates about state and individual
representation).
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representation in Congress.26 Shortly after the 1787 Convention
began, a series of reforms were offered. First was the plan offered
by Virginia, often referred to as the big state plan, under which
states would receive representation in Congress based on
population.27 In response, New Jersey offered the alternative, small
state plan premised on equal representation, similar to the Articles
of Confederation schema.28 While these dueling plans are mostly
viewed as a debate between the more and less populous states, the
two plans also indicate a divide between free states and slave
states.29 Simple representation based on population would generally
favor the more populous free states, especially if only free White
people were counted; the slave states disfavored such an
arrangement because they feared that this system would lead to
emancipation.30
Finally, the Connecticut Plan emerged, offering a bicameral
legislature—parallel to the British House of Commons and House
of Lords—where the former would be based on population and
represent the people’s interests, while the latter would have equal
representation and represent the states’ interests.31 Yet this
compromise did not resolve the problem. It left open the issue of
whom to count for the purposes of representation.32 The slave states
wished to include slaves in the count for representation, while the
northern free states opposed such inclusion and wanted slaves
counted only for purposes of taxation.33 Convention attendees,

26 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, art. V, para. 4 (“In determining questions in
the United States, in Congress assembled, each State shall have one vote.”).
27 See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 88–91 (outlining the Virginia Plan).
28 See id. at 91–93 (summarizing the New Jersey Plan).
29 Cf. VILE, supra note 25, at 89 (arguing that, in the debates over the three-fifths clause,
“[t]he earlier fault line between large states and small states was . . . replicated among free
states and slave states with respect to the representation and taxation of slaves”).
30 See Juan F. Perea, Echoes of Slavery II: How Slavery’s Legacy Distorts Democracy, 51
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2018) (noting that “the Northern states had many more
qualified, free white male voters than the slave South,” so their “greater political power under
representative democracy posed an unacceptable threat to slavery”).
31 See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 93–95 (describing the “Great Compromise” as
“acceptable” because “[the North] expected in the future to be outnumbered by the South and
it . . . looked on equal state representation in the Senate as providing needed long-range
protection”).
32 See id. at 95–96 (providing background on the three-fifths clause).
33 VILE, supra note 25, at 88–89.
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including James Madison,34 recognized that not counting slaves for
representation would hurt the South and urged their inclusion for
congressional representation.35 The result was the infamous ThreeFifths Compromise, which counted slaves at that ratio for both
representation and taxation purposes.
Next, there was the debate over voting. There was never a
serious debate about providing a universal right to vote in the U.S.
Constitution.36 This was simply too divisive of an issue and was
complicated by slavery, among other issues.37 If there had been a
discussion of voting rights, then it would have had to address thorny
questions such as property qualifications and the franchise for
women and freed slaves.38 The Constitutional Convention avoided a
tumultuous and lengthy debate by leaving voting rights up to the
states—largely where the issue remains today.39 The Framers
effectively left franchise in the hands of White, property owning,
adult males who are largely of a mainline religious faith—the
classic stereotype of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant.40 Moreover,
the U.S. Senate was appointed by state legislatures, thereby leaving
little for the people to vote for beyond the House members.41

34 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 322, 486 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
35 See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 225–
29 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966) (demonstrating Madison’s proposal that slaves be counted in some
proportion for representation in Congress).
36 See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (rev. ed. 2000) (“The convention’s debates about suffrage . . . were
brief, and the final document made little mention of the breadth of the franchise.”).
37 Cf. Perea, supra note 30, at 1091 (“In general, suffrage was limited to property-owning
white males. The original Constitution was silent on the right to vote, except to specify that
state legislatures would determine the ‘manner’ of selection of electors for the presidency.”
(footnote omitted)).
38 See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 13–17 (explaining how the states initially allocated
the right to vote).
39 See Perea, supra note 30, at 1091 (“[U]nder the Constitution states retained their original
colonial powers to determine the qualifications of voters. While subsequent amendments
forbade state discrimination with regard to race, sex, age, and poll taxes, states remained
free to decide for themselves all other qualifications for voters.” (footnote omitted)).
40 See KEYSSAR, supra note 36, at 23–26 (discussing the changes made in voting
requirements throughout the first century of the United States).
41 See David Schleicher, The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in an Age of National
Political Parties, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1043, 1050–53 (2014) (describing the Framers’ decision to
have Senators be appointed by state legislatures and for the House to be directly elected).
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The resulting compromises, including the two-house Congress
with equal and per capita representation, the Three-Fifths
Compromise, and the delay on the halt on slave trade, all spoke to
the compromises to overcome polarization and division caused by
slavery.42 Thus, a quick look at the representation scheme in
Congress and voting rights reveals that both were skewed in favor
of the slave states. Allowing slave states to count three-fifths of
slaves for the purposes of representation provided those states with
approximately ten additional House members, and the equal
representation in the Senate provided more representation in that
chamber than would have been afforded given their population visà-vis the free states.43 The system of representation in Congress did
not favor majority rule. It enabled minority rule by a limited
number of wealthy individuals, protecting slaveholder interests and
excluding rights for just about anyone else.
When the task came to selecting the president, fears of
majoritarianism again prevailed.44 In Federalist No. 68, Alexander
Hamilton described the need to create a president who was above
popular opinion and able to lead while remaining accountable to the

42 See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 93–96 (describing these “North-South
compromises”); MALONE & RAUCH, supra note 21, at 235–37 (same); see also RICHARD
BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 333–36 (2009)
(explaining how these compromises further entrenched and protected slavery); GEORGE
WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 270 (2010) (“The Constitution was an obstacle to ending
black slavery in America.”); Finkelman, supra note 9, at 1155 (noting Madison’s observation
that the right to vote was a divisive issue between the North and the South); James Oakes,
“The Compromising Expedient”: Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV.
2023, 2023–27 (1996) (describing the Constitution as a proslavery document). See generally
PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON (3d ed. 2014).
43 See DONALD L. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1765–
1820, at 23, 39, 180, 404 (1971) (presenting the data that support this conclusion); Perea,
supra note 30, at 1089 (“Each state’s electoral votes incorporated representation based on
three-fifths of the number of slaves, therefore boosting the electoral representation of slave
states.”).
44 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 164
(1913) (“After voting down by a large majority a proposal for an election by the people, and
by a majority of one a proposal for an election by electors chosen by the people, the convention
divided equally upon the general proposition for an election by electors.”).
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people.45 At the Constitutional Convention, similar debates
occurred over the selection of the president, with little support for
direct selection by the people.46 The result was the Electoral College
where the people’s right to vote was largely left to the states.47
In the simplest terms, the U.S. Constitution originally outlined
a two-stage process for the selection of the president.48 The use of
the Electoral College to elect the president was a way of avoiding
the need to discuss voting rights, again a favor to the slave states.49
Under this system, states would appoint electors who then picked
the president. The candidate receiving the most electoral votes
would be the President, and the runner up would be Vice President.
The original U.S. Constitution was designed with the hope that
political parties would not emerge50 and that the electors would
serve as elder wise sages to pick the president, ensuring that the
people would not make the wrong choice.51 Martin Diamond,
perhaps the most emphatic defender of the Electoral College, saw it
as yet another mechanism to check majority faction and to protect
minority rights.52 Finally, given how the electoral votes were to be
allocated based on representation in Congress, it again immediately
favored slaveholding states and their interests.
As anti-majoritarian as this system was, the logic of the Electoral
College deteriorated quickly. Originally, the Framers did not intend
to have political parties, as evidenced by the fact that the top two
electoral vote recipients would become President and Vice President
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, supra note 16, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It was
desir[]able that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so
important a trust was to be confided.”).
46 MADISON, supra note 35, at 50–52; see also supra note 44.
47 See ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE
PRESENT 8–35 (2018) (criticizing the Framers’ compromises); see also supra notes 37, 39.
48 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (detailing the two-step process for electing the president).
49 See Perea, supra note 30, at 1089 (“The only reason we have an electoral college rather
than a more direct popular election was the need of slave owners to have additional
representation based on their slave ownership. Without this ‘slave bonus,’ Southern slave
states . . . would have been outvoted every time, as Madison recognized.”).
50 See 1 KELLY ET AL., supra note 16, at 129–30 (stating that the Framers did not anticipate
the formation of political parties); BURNS, supra note 16, at 91 (“The political
leadership . . . had no theory of party.”).
51 See MALONE & RAUCH, supra note 21, at 237 (noting that electors presumably would be
“a group of qualified men” who “would follow their own judgment in voting”).
52 See generally MARTIN DIAMOND, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE AMERICAN IDEA OF
DEMOCRACY (1977) (defending the Electoral College from several criticisms).
45
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respectively. However, by 1796, political parties had emerged.53
Then the idea of giving electors wide-open discretion to pick
presidents also collapsed. Many of the Framers urged winner-takeall allocation of electoral votes within each state to maximize their
influence, and possibly reward the party in control.54 By the middle
of the 1790s, political parties had emerged across America with
influential figures like Thomas Jefferson urging states to create a
winner-take-all system for the allocation of electoral votes.55 He
specifically argued that for the election of 1800 in Virginia.56 The
idea was that such a system would maximize the political influence
of states. It was also appealing to the then-emerging parties because
it meant that the opposition in a specific state would get no electoral
votes, creating a zero-sum game for elections that rewarded
partisan strength.57 With Jefferson’s party in control, he was able
to help his partisan interests at the expense of the Federalist Party.
Winner-take-all allowed for “banking” electoral votes, meaning a
party could bank the states it knew it would win, allowing it to then
concentrate on the few that were uncertain and potentially decisive.
Finally, turning the selection of the president and the electors into
de facto party functions transformed electors from wise independent
persons who would find the best president into tools of the party.58
The 1800 presidential election completed the transformation of
presidential selection into a party-driven process when it featured

53 See Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College
with The District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 223 (2012) (“By 1796, political
parties began to rise . . . . Presidential electors, originally thought to be searchers of a
presidential candidate of nationwide character, became political party instruments selected
for party loyalty and voted on already decided presidential candidates.” (footnotes omitted));
MALONE & RAUCH, supra note 21, at 237 (“[Electors] came to follow party judgments rather
than personal opinions after parties arose . . . .”).
54 See Herbst, supra note 53, at 226 (“The [winner-take-all] method appealed to political
parties because if a party received more popular votes in a state than the opposing party, the
opposing party received no electoral votes.”).
55 See id. (“As the election of 1800 approached, politicians in both parties created methods
of choosing electors in states to maximize their own party’s electoral vote totals.”).
56 See id. (“Virginia changed from a district voting method of selecting electors to a winnertake-all method to ensure Thomas Jefferson would receive all of Virginia’s electoral votes.
Jefferson’s subsequent victory in 1800 signaled that allocating a state’s electoral votes in a
winner-take-all fashion could politically benefit a state.” (footnote omitted)).
57 See id. (“Over time, as party politics became increasingly entrenched in the nation, more
states allocated their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis.”).
58 See supra note 53.
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the first fully partisan election.59 Thomas Jefferson ran with a slate
that included Aaron Burr as the Democratic-Republican Party vicepresidential candidate against the Federalist Party slate of John
Adams and Thomas Pinckney. Jefferson encouraged his party
members to cast their votes for his ticket with Burr, leading to a tie
and eventually a tense struggle in the House of Representatives
that ultimately produced Jefferson as President.60 The emergence
of party politics in the United States resulted from the disputed
election of 1800. It took the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment to
recognize presidential party politics,61 but it was a crude graft onto
a system that had envisioned an entirely different purpose for the
Electoral College.
The winner-take all-system for the allocation of electoral votes
created a new problem for minority rights—the locking out of
individuals who were part of a partisan minority within a state.
This system placed the power of selecting presidents in the hands
of White-dominated state legislatures, effectively disenfranchising
African American voters.62 If a state was balanced in terms of party
control, then perhaps the state was competitive, at least initially in
terms of the selection of electors. But once the votes were cast,
winner-take-all meant one side would win and the losers went home
empty-handed. Even as franchise rights or eligibility expanded in
the nineteenth century, these expansions continued to protect
limited voting rights for a select few. As a result, no more than a few
voters in each state would have any influence over the selection of
presidential electors.

III. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN OPERATION
The origin of the Electoral College is rooted in slavery. It both
entrenched minority rights by empowering White males who owned
property—and, more specifically, slaveholders in the southern
59 See Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change,
108 YALE L.J. 1959, 1963 (1999) (discussing letters between Thomas Jefferson and John
Adams where Jefferson described “political parties and their role in American politics”
following the election of 1800).
60 Id. at 1962–63.
61 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (establishing the Electoral College).
62 See Perea, supra note 30, at 1092 (“White-controlled state legislatures enacted ostensibly
race-neutral, yet racially targeted voting qualifications and rules to disqualify African
Americans, and, in the Southwest, Mexican Americans.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol55/iss4/6

12

Schultz: Minority Rights and the Electoral College: What Minority, Whose R

2021]

MINORITY RIGHTS

1633

states—while also suppressing the minority rights of people of color.
But its anti-majoritarianism did not end there. The system’s antimajoritarian nature is evidenced by the fact that one can win the
presidential popular vote but lose the electoral vote, which has
happened five times in U.S. history—in 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and
2016.63 This popular and electoral vote split alone speaks to the
anti-majoritarianism of the institution.
The 1876 presidential election featured Democratic nominee
Samuel Tilden challenging the Republican nominee Rutherford B.
Hayes.64 This election took place within the constraints of
Reconstruction.65 During Reconstruction, Republicans in Congress
sought to undo the legacy of slavery and discrimination with
numerous measures. A few of these measures included extension of
the Freedmen’s Bureau to help former slaves and the adoption of
the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the Civil
Rights Act of 1875, and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively.66 These
measures sought to bring economic and political rights to
emancipated slaves and, in the case of the Fifteenth Amendment,
voting rights.67 Using their newly acquired voting rights, African
American males were able to elect many Black people to public
office, even across what was very recently the Confederacy.68
Southern leaders did not take this easily. They fought
Reconstruction measures both formally and informally with the rise
of the KKK.69 However, in order to enforce Reconstruction efforts,
the federal government maintained troops in the South and
63 See generally ROBERT M. ALEXANDER, REPRESENTATION AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
(2019) (listing 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016 among its discussion of “electoral college
misfires”).
64 Chris Land & David Schultz, On the Unenforceability of the Electoral Count Act, 13
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 340, 349–50 (2016).
65 See id. at 349–51 (describing the election as “grounded in lingering feelings of
sectionalism and the bitter legacy of the Civil War” and under the control of “Reconstructionera Republican governors”).
66 See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at
228–80 (1988) (providing a history of Reconstruction and the first wave of Black suffrage).
67 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (securing the right to vote for African American men).
68 See FONER, supra note 66, at 351–55 (elaborating upon Black elected officials’ electoral
success during Reconstruction); see also Michael D. Cobb & Jeffery A. Jenkins, Race and the
Representation of Blacks’ Interests During Reconstruction, 54 POL. RSCH. Q. 181, 185 (2001)
(“[Twenty-two] different blacks were elected to Congress between 1869 and 1901 . . . .”).
69 See FONER, supra note 66, at 425–44 (discussing the KKK’s anti-Black violence).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 [2021], Art. 6

1634

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1621

prevented many state leaders from voting, or even having
representation in Congress, until they recognized the rights of the
former slaves.70 The 1876 election took place amidst these
tumultuous circumstances. At that time, the total number of
electoral votes was 369, with 185 needed to win.71 After the popular
vote was completed, Tilden had a majority but held only 184
electoral votes to Hayes’s 165.72 Four states, including Florida,
Louisiana, Oregon, and South Carolina, held a total of twenty
electoral votes that were in dispute.73
This dispute led Congress to create the Electoral Commission on
January 29, 1877 in order to resolve the election with regard to
these four states.74 After a series of negotiations, a deal was
struck.75 Democrats agreed to let the decision of the Commission
prevail, giving the presidency to Hayes, if Hayes agreed that, upon
being sworn into office, he would remove the federal troops from the
South.76 Hayes agreed, and, in 1877, the troops were removed,
thereby ending Reconstruction.
The 1877 deal stands for several propositions when it comes to
the Electoral College. First, a presidential election was resolved by
lawmakers capitulating to racism and selling out the rights of a
minority group.77 Second, the commission that was created to
resolve the 1876 election eventually led to the passage of the
Electoral Count Act of 1887.78 The Electoral Count Act is still in

70 See John Lewis & Archie E. Allen, Black Voter Registration Efforts in the South, 48
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 105, 105 (1972) (“Under the supervision of military rulers in five
districts, established to replace the former White southern governments, more than 700,000
blacks were registered to vote within a year.”).
71 Land & Schultz, supra note 64, at 350.
72 Id.
73 See id. at 351 (“[B]y December 1876, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Oregon
each submitted multiple sets of electoral votes to Congress for consideration.”).
74 See id. at 356 (explaining that the Electoral Commission served as a “fact-finder
operating on behalf of Congress”).
75 See id. at 352 (“President Grant and the House and Senate approved the creation of a
statutory commission in the Electoral Commission Act by wide majorities in January 1877.”).
76 See id. at 353 (describing the “backroom deal” between Southern Democrats and
Republican leaders to end Reconstruction); FONER, supra note 66, at 581–87 (discussing
Hayes’s abandonment of Reconstruction). See generally MICHAEL F. HOLT, BY ONE VOTE: THE
DISPUTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1876 (2008).
77 FONER, supra note 66, at 582–83.
78 See Land & Schultz, supra note 64, at 368–69 (comparing the Electoral Commission Act
of 1877 and the Electoral Count Act of 1887); Stephen A. Siegel, The Conscientious
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place and potentially could serve as a tool to resolve disputes in the
counting of electoral votes.79 Yet this Act itself amplifies the antimajoritarianism of the Electoral College by setting up a commission
that favors a small number of states and only represents a small
number of interests.80 Third, the end of Reconstruction led to the
Jim Crow Era.81 This period, lasting up to the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), permitted the disenfranchisement of most
people of color in the South and perpetuated solid Democratic
control in the region until the 1960s.82

IV. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE SWING STATE
PHENOMENA
When the Framers created the U.S. Constitution, they
presupposed the absence of political parties, or at least they hoped
to discourage them.83 But they did arise, and the resulting
partisanship has ebbed and flowed over time. Simultaneously, state
electoral vote allocation shifted to a winner-take-all system, with
forty-eight of the fifty states allotting their electoral votes in that
fashion.84 This process has historically disenfranchised individuals
belonging to their state’s non-majority party, leaving them with no
electors even if they win a substantial amount of the popular vote
in a state.85 This renders minority voices near speechless. This

Congressman’s Guide to the Electoral Count Act of 1887, 56 FLA. L. REV. 541, 554–56 (2004)
(describing the creation of the Electoral Commission and its influence on the resulting
congressional debate regarding the Electoral Count Act).
79 See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2018) (outlining the process for counting electoral votes in Congress).
80 See Land & Schultz, supra note 64, at 356–60 (discussing potential constitutional
challenges to the Electoral Commission).
81 See generally HENRY LOUIS GATES JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE
SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM CROW (2020) (describing the rise of Jim Crow, segregation,
and the loss of African American voting rights after the end of Reconstruction).
82 See generally V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION (1949) (outlining
the development of the political landscape of the American South); KARI FREDERICKSON, THE
DIXIECRAT REVOLT AND THE END OF THE SOLID SOUTH, 1932–1968 (2001) (describing the
impact of the Dixiecrat movement on southern politics).
83 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
84 See Herbst, supra note 53, at 219 (“Currently, every state, except Nebraska and Maine,
uses a winner-take-all approach to allocate all of its electoral votes . . . .”).
85 See Wilfred U. Codrington III, The Electoral College’s Racist Origins, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUST. (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/electoral-
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disenfranchisement has also produced the presidential swing state
phenomena.86 Partisanship is not geographically balanced across
the United States. There are unequal percentages of Democrats and
Republicans across all 435 congressional districts and among the
fifty states.87 There are some areas where one party dominates and
has done so for many years.88 This “big sort” of political parties89 has
yielded a situation where, increasingly, one party holds the clear
numerical majority in a state.90 In theory this is not a problem, but,
at least in the current configuration of presidential politics, it
creates an Electoral College perversity due to the hardened
partisanship in American politics.91 This problem stems from
colleges-racist-origins (arguing that racial disenfranchisement was a key motivation behind
the creation of the Electoral College).
86 See Stacey Hunter Hecht & David Schultz, Introduction: Swing States and Presidential
Elections (examining the relationship between the “swing-state phenomena” and the winnertakell Electoral College system), in PRESIDENTIAL SWING STATES: WHY ONLY TEN MATTER ix,
xxxiii–xxxvi (Stacey Hunter Hecht & David Schultz eds., 2015); Perea, supra note 30, at 1090
(“Because of our electoral system, candidates concentrate their attention only on a few swing
states and essentially ignore the rest of the country.”).
87 See Hecht & Schultz, supra note 86, at xxxv (distinguishing “swing” from “safe” states).
88 See, e.g., id. (“[A]t present, New York and Massachusetts seem like safe Democrat states,
whereas Texas and Oklahoma seem safe for the Republicans.”).
89 See generally BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED
AMERICA IS TEARING US APART (2009) (arguing that internal migration based on political
preference is creating self-sorted “red” and “blue” states that are increasingly polarized).
90 See MORRIS P. FIORINA, HOOVER INST., THE POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE SORTED 1 (2020),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/fiorina_3_finalfile.pdf (arguing that
while the public “has not polarized, it is better sorted than a generation ago”).
91 See generally ZOLTAN L. HAJNAL, DANGEROUSLY DIVIDED: HOW RACE AND CLASS SHAPE
WINNING AND LOSING IN AMERICAN POLITICS 101–11 (2020) (finding that candidates most
favored by Black voters enjoy the least amount of electoral success in American elections);
EZRA KLEIN, WHY WE’RE POLARIZED (2020) (explaining how partisan identity has merged
with other forms of identity politics in ways that have increased partisan polarization);
MORGAN MARIETTA & DAVID C. BARKER, ONE NATION, TWO REALITIES: DUELING FACTS IN
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2019) (studying the causes of why Americans are increasingly
divided over how they perceive reality); NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE
NEEDS TO KNOW 134–39 (2019) (discussing the impact partisan polarization has on public
policy and governance); RYAN D. ENOS, THE SPACE BETWEEN US: SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY AND
POLITICS (2017) (examining how social geography affects partisan polarization); LYN
RAGSDALE & JERROLD G. RUSK, THE AMERICAN NONVOTER (2017) (arguing that nonvoters
choose not to vote when they perceive little uncertainty about the nation’s trajectory and
therefore see little difference between candidates); THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN,
IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED
WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF EXTREMISM (2012) (arguing that conservative partisans have
asymmetrically polarized); JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS:
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combining hardened partisanship, partisan geographic sorting, and
a winner-take-all method for selecting presidential electors. The
result is a situation where only a handful of states matter, as seen
in recent elections.92 Therefore, the outcome of presidential
elections gets determined by a mere handful of swing voters in a few
swing states.93 A minority of a minority decides a presidential race
because most voters do not matter.
What do we mean by “matter”? Before the 2020 election took
place, one could have argued that the presidential election was
effectively over in most states. Over time, a partisan rigidity has
formed, leaving the voting outcomes in the vast majority of states
predictable.94 In 2012 and 2016 there were between ten and twelve
swing states, and in 2020 the number may have been as small as
seven.95 The geographic distribution of partisan voters in forty-three
states and the hardening of partisan preferences give minority
party voters little say in the presidential election because of the
winner-take-all method for allocating electoral votes. For example,
Republicans in New York or Democrats in Oklahoma are effectively
permanent minorities who are disenfranchised in the presidential
race. In 2016, less than 80,000 votes decided the presidential
HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS
137–41 (2010) (explaining the decline of “middle-class democracy”); MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK,
WILLIAM G. JACOBY, HELMUT NORPOTH & HERBERT F. WEISBERG, THE AMERICAN VOTER
REVISITED 60–82 (2008) (studying how individual voters’ perceptions of parties and
candidates affects their voting behavior); SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 107 (2003) (finding only “mixed evidence”
regarding whether legislative gridlock affects legislators’ electoral success); WARREN E.
MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN VOTER 494–525 (1996) (studying how
voters’ social and economic backgrounds impact their choices for President); SIDNEY VERBA
& NORMAN H. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
(1972) (studying participation in the American political process in the areas of voting,
campaigning, communal activity, and engagement with public officials); ANGUS CAMPBELL,
PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER & DONALD E. STOKES, THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960)
(examining voting behavior with a comprehensive study of election survey data).
92 See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Nate Cohn, A Sliver of the Electorate Could Decide 2020. Here’s What These
Voters Want., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/upshot/swingvoters-2020-election.html (“[T]hese ‘mythic,’ ‘quasi-talismanic,’ ‘unicorn’ swing voters are
very real, and there are enough of them to decide the next presidential election.”).
94 See, e.g., supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
95 Kellie Pantekoek & David Schultz, The Electoral College History and What it Means for
Future Elections, FINDLAW (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.findlaw.com/voting/how-u-s-elections-work/electoral-college-history-with-professor-david-schultz.html.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

17

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 4 [2021], Art. 6

1638

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:1621

outcome, with Donald Trump winning Michigan, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin.96 In 2020, despite Joe Biden winning the popular vote by
more than seven million votes, Donald Trump would have won the
electoral vote again had he flipped or received approximately 43,000
more votes.97

V. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND RACE
Among the most consequential series of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions issued in the second half of the twentieth century were
those addressing malapportionment and redistricting. Beginning in
the 1946 case of Colegrove v. Green, the Court first declared that
matters of reapportionment were nonjusticiable.98 The Court found
that failure to reapportion and redraw congressional districts
despite migration patterns over several decades did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause because this issue was preempted by
congressional authority under the Guarantee Clause.99
Colegrove did not stand long. In 1960, the Court ruled in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot that efforts to draw legislative districts in a
way that discriminated against African Americans violated the
Fifteenth Amendment.100 Two years later, in Baker v. Carr, the
Court reversed Colegrove, ruling that claims of malapportionment
were justiciable.101 Baker launched the reapportionment revolution
where the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that congressional, legislative,
See Dave Leip, 2016 Presidential General Election Results, DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S.
ELECTIONS, https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited May 20, 2021) (showing that,
in 2016, Trump won Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin respectively by 10,704, 44,284,
and 22,748 votes or, collectively, 77,736 votes).
97 See Dave Leip, 2020 Presidential General Election Results, DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S.
ELECTIONS, https://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS/ (last visited May 20, 2021) (showing that,
in 2020, Biden won Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin by 10,457, 11,779, and 20,682 votes
respectively, or, collectively, by 42,918 votes).
98 See 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946) (plurality opinion) (stating that the petitioners are asking
for relief “beyond [the Court’s] competence to grant” because the issue of reapportionment is
“of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not [appropriate] for judicial determination”).
99 See id. at 356 (“Violation of the great guaranty of a republican form of government in
States cannot be challenged in the courts.”).
100 See 364 U.S. 339, 346 (1960) (distinguishing Colegrove and holding that “[w]hen a
legislature . . . singles out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special
discriminatory treatment, it violates the Fifteenth Amendment”).
101 See 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (“[A]llegations of a denial of equal protection present a
justiciable constitutional cause of action . . . .”).
96
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and local government elected bodies must conform to the “one
person, one vote” standard.102
Following the reapportionment revolution, the Court heard a
second wave of redistricting cases, addressing claims that the
drawing of boundaries based on race also violated the Equal
Protection Clause or the VRA. There is a rich history of the U.S.
Supreme Court and lower federal courts using the VRA to root out
practices that denied people of color their rights to vote and to
representation.103 For instance, in Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court
ruled that in situations where racially polarized voting existed,
states may be required to draw district lines in a way to protect
minority voting rights.104 But the Court vacillated over the degree
to which states could consider race when redistricting. While the
Court held that race could not be the sole105 or predominant
factor,106 it eventually allowed states to consider race when drawing
lines.107 Between the Equal Protection Clause and the VRA claims,
the Court effectively rooted out many forms of racial discrimination
in districting, while also improving minority representation in both
Congress and state and local governments.108 In terms of the VRA,
the Section 5 preclearance provisions and the Section 2 anti-dilution

102 DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 148–49 (2014); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[A]n individual’s right to vote for state legislators
is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is . . . diluted when compared with votes of
citizens living in other parts of the State.”).
103 See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, RACE AND REDISTRICTING: THE SHAW-CROMARTIE
CASES (2002) (describing the role of the VRA in addressing racial gerrymandering).
104 478 U.S. 30, 52–60 (1986).
105 See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 645 (1993) (“[D]istrict lines obviously drawn for the
purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption.”).
106 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 980 (1996) (plurality opinion) (“Significant deviations
from traditional districting principles . . . cause constitutional harm insofar as they convey
the message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.”).
107 See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 249 (2001) (“[The Constitution] simply imposes
an obligation not to create such districts for predominantly racial, as opposed to political or
traditional, districting motivations.”).
108 See Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Minority
Representation: Black Officeholding in Southern State Legislatures and Congressional
Delegations (discussing how the VRA successfully enabled more Black officeholders to win
elections), in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965–1990, at 335, 335–36 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
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requirements improved representation and eliminated many
practices that disenfranchised minority voters.109
The point here is not to provide a comprehensive review of
minority voting rights jurisprudence. Rather, at one point the
federal courts were, at least in theory, interested in promoting or
protecting minority voting rights. However, at no point was the U.S.
Supreme Court willing to apply the Equal Protection Clause or VRA
to the Electoral College to address practices that have
disenfranchised racial minorities or those who hold minority party
status within a state. In theory, the Court could.
Race continues to divide America.110 Some argue that race is the
“most important driving force in American electoral democracy.”111
The Black-White divide is greater than class, gender, or any other
variable.112 There is clear evidence of racially polarized voting in
presidential elections,113 with race overlapping with party
affiliation,114 rendering Blacks “super losers” in these elections.115
Effectively, in the United States, an electoral scheme that favors
one party probably favors a specific race, too. The racial gap is not
disappearing, but may be wider now than ever before,116 and
evidence suggests that the racial gap is calcifying.117 Despite this
reality, the courts have ignored this issue when it comes to how
states allocate electoral votes.

109 See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second
Reconstruction (explaining how VRA Sections 2 and 5 have increased minority representation
and voting power), in QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, supra note 108, at 378, 381–86.
110 See HAJNAL, supra note 91, at 13 (“Race is a powerful demographic force dividing
Americans.”).
111 Id. at 57.
112 See id. (“The 52-point Black-White divide overshadows every other demographic
divide . . . .”).
113 See id. at 13 (finding that the majority of White voters and the majority of minority
voters disagree on candidates “from the highest to the lowest office”).
114 Id. at 53.
115 See id. at 107 (“Overall, 41 percent of all Black voters can be characterized as ‘super
losers,’ meaning that they choose the loser in all three [elections for President, the Senate,
and governor].”).
116 Id. at 65.
117 See generally CHRISTOPHER D. DESANTE & CANDIS WATTS SMITH, RACIAL STASIS: THE
MILLENNIAL GENERATION AND THE STAGNATION OF RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN POLITICS
(2020) (arguing that, even with a generational shift, there is mixed evidence at best of a
narrowing or changing of racial attitudes, especially among younger Whites).
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In McPherson v. Blacker, the Court considered a challenge to a
Michigan state law that allocated electoral votes on the basis of
congressional districts.118 Upholding the law, the Court ruled that
states have broad plenary power to distribute electoral votes in the
way their state legislatures desire.119 However, the Court seemed to
suggest a possible limit to this plenary power in situations involving
discrimination.120 The Court suggested that violations of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments might constrain the
allocation of state electors.121 For example, if a state were to allocate
electoral votes in a manner that declared that no persons of color
were eligible to become electors, one would hope that such a direct
pronouncement would violate the U.S. Constitution. Yet, to this day,
the Court has not directly addressed this issue, but it seems to have
exempted the states’ allocation of electoral votes from Equal
Protection Clause, Fifteenth Amendment, and VRA analysis.122
In 1966, the State of Delaware challenged the winner-take-all
system for the allocation of electoral votes.123 In its brief asking the
U.S. Supreme Court to accept the case, it referred to the winnertake-all system as a state-unit system.124 Central to its challenge
against the states using winner-take-all systems, was that the
system operates “to deny and abridge fundamental rights of
plaintiff, its citizens and large numbers of persons in other
states.”125 The winner-take-all system did so by violating the Equal

146 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1892).
Id. at 25.
120 See id. at 40 (“If presidential electors are appointed by the legislatures, no
discrimination is made; if they are elected in districts where each citizen has an equal right
to vote the same as any other citizen has, no discrimination is made.”).
121 See id. at 37–40 (discussing how state legislatures can no longer appoint “in such
manner as [they] may direct” due to the Fourteenth Amendment).
122 See generally Charles S. Bullock III, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Justin Wert, Electoral
College Reform and Voting Rights, 1 FAULKNER L. REV. 89 (2009) (arguing that had the VRA
been applied to the use of winner-take-all system for allocating electoral votes it would have
been invalidated by the courts under tests used by them to strike down other forms of
representation such as at-large seats).
123 See generally Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966) (mem.).
124 See Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint and Brief, Delaware v. New York,
385 U.S. 895 (1966) (mem.) (No. 28), 1966 WL 100407, at *2 (“The suit challenges the
constitutionality of the . . . ‘state unit-vote’ system, by which the total number of presidential
electoral votes of a state is arbitrarily misappropriated for the candidate receiving a bare
plurality of the total number of citizens’ votes cast within the state.”).
125 Id. at *6.
118
119
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Protection Clause: it arbitrarily misallocated the elective power of
some states and voters and denied partisan minority voting rights
in some states.126 The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case
and, as Lawrence Lessig has contended, the nature of presidential
elections might be different had the Court taken the case and
stricken down the winner-take-all allocation method.127
In Williams v. Virginia State Board of Elections, a district court
upheld the winner-take-all allocation process, rejecting claims that
it violated the one person, one vote rule.128 The U.S. Supreme Court
summarily affirmed the decision.129 Then, in Hitson v. Baggett,
another district court rejected challenges by persons of color who
claimed that the winner-take-all system discriminated against
them.130 The court rejected their claim, arguing, in part, that this
discrimination was contemplated by the U.S. Constitution131 and
that their votes were not cancelled.132
In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Abbott, a district
court dismissed claims that Texas’s winner-take-all allocation of
electoral votes violated the Equal Protection Clause, the First

126 See id. at *7 (“In every election the state unit system abridges the political rights of
substantial numbers of persons by arbitrarily awarding all of the electoral votes of their state
to the candidate receiving a bare plurality of its popular votes.”).
127 See Lawrence Lessig, Exactly 50 years Ago, the Supreme Court Ducked the Question
Whether the “Winner Take All” System for Allocating Electors Violates the Equal Protection
Clause, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2016), https://medium.com/@lessig/exactly-50-years-ago-thesupreme-court-ducked-the-question-whether-the-winner-take-all-system-234daf281ef2
(“How different the world would have been if the Court had taken up Delaware’s request, and
tested whether . . . ‘winner take all’ is consistent with the principle of ‘one person, one vote’—
because it plainly is not.”).
128 See 288 F. Supp. 622, 627 (E.D. Va. 1968) (“[I]t is difficult to equate the deprivations
imposed by the unit rule with the denial of privileges outlawed by the one-person, one-vote
doctrine . . . .”).
129 Williams v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 320 (1969) (per curiam).
130 See 446 F. Supp. 674, 676 (M.D. Ala. 1978) (“No minority group has a right under the
Constitution to insist that state electoral systems be designed . . . to give its members
electoral control over the selection of persons for particular political offices.”), aff’d, 580 F.2d
1051 (5th Cir. 1978) (unpublished table decision).
131 See id. at 676 (“The discrimination of which plaintiffs complain . . . is a product of the
constitutional mandate that our president be elected through an ‘Electoral College.’ As such,
it is a type of ‘discrimination’ specifically sanctioned by the Constitution.”).
132 See id. (“[T]here is no contention that Alabama’s electoral scheme for the selection of
presidential electors operates [to nullify minority voters’ voting strength].”).
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Amendment, and the VRA.133 It granted the motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, arguing that existing precedent governed.134
Challenges to other state winner-take-all allocation systems have
met a similar fate.135 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have been unwilling to extend the one person, one
vote standard to the allocation of electoral votes, thereby permitting
the same type of minority disenfranchisement as the one found in
prior districting cases.136 These decisions rejecting the application
of the one person, one vote standard to states’ winner-take-all
systems have left states free to disenfranchise political minorities.
The U.S. Supreme Court could have reached a different
conclusion and declared that the winner-take-all system was
constrained by Reynolds v. Sims137 and other cases.138 It chose not
to do so.139 Similarly, others have argued that the winner-take-all
system racially discriminates against people of color.140 One can
look at the jurisdictions previously covered by the VRA and find that
many of the minority votes are lost there. McPherson offers
precedent to argue that state allocation of electoral votes could be
limited if it discriminated against people of color.141 Even though
the Court declared the VRA’s Section 4 coverage formula
unconstitutional,
rendering
Section
5
preclearance
unenforceable,142 there is still no reason why the VRA, the Equal
Protection Clause, or the Fifteenth Amendment cannot apply.
What does all this mean? The winner-take-all system of
allocating electoral votes perpetuates discrimination against people
133 See 369 F. Supp. 3d 768, 787 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment
“one person, one vote,” First Amendment freedom of association, and VRA Section 2 claims).
134 Id.
135 See, e.g., Baten v. McMaster, 967 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2020) (affirming the dismissal
of plaintiffs’ complaint against South Carolina’s winner-take-all system); Lyman v. Baker,
352 F. Supp. 3d 81, 84 (D. Mass. 2018) (“[T]he Court concludes that the Massachusetts
winner-take-all system of selecting electors in presidential elections is constitutional.”).
136 See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
137 See 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats in
both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.”).
138 See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
139 See generally Estes Kefauver, The Electoral College: Old Reforms Take on a New Look,
27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 188 (1962) (arguing that Baker v. Carr and the reapportionment
cases could be used to challenge the winner-take-all electoral college allocation method).
140 See, e.g., supra notes 7–11.
141 See supra notes 120–121 and accompanying text.
142 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
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of color much in the way that the original creation of the Electoral
College did. Even with the adoption of the VRA in 1965 and the
switch of the South from Democratic to Republican Party control,143
people of color were effectively disenfranchised. Voting occurred in
a racially polarized fashion consistent with what the U.S. Supreme
Court has said constitutes a Section 2 VRA violation,144 yet the
courts remain unwilling to apply it to the electoral vote allocation
system. But the winner-take-all system has perpetuated Jim Crow
at the Electoral College level despite the fact that people of color are
an increasing portion of the electorate, including in the states that
were part of the Confederacy.

VI. WHAT 2020 MEANS
Georgia’s flip to the Democratic Party in both the presidential
and U.S. Senate races came as a surprise to many. On one level,
perhaps the flip vindicates Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion
in Shelby County v. Holder when he pointed to statistics indicating
parity in voter registration for Blacks and Whites across the South,
insinuating that perhaps the VRA might no longer be needed.145
Maybe Georgia in 2020 is proof that Jim Crow and voter
suppression are relics of a bygone era and that the Electoral College
is no longer an anti-majoritarian institution.
Georgia was a surprise, but it was also a product of a perfect
storm that may not be replicable, and these recent results may not
serve as a harbinger for the rest of the South. What happened in
2020 was a product of a concerted, multiyear organizing strategy by
Democrats and Stacey Abrams.146 It also benefitted from a large

143 Charles S. Bullock III, Introduction: Southern Politics in the Twenty-First Century, in
THE NEW POLITICS OF THE OLD SOUTH: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOUTHERN POLITICS, 1, 1–2
(Charles S. Bullock III & Mark J. Rozell eds., 4th ed. 2010).
144 See Ben Boris, Note, The VRA at a Crossroads: The Ability of Section 2 to Address
Discriminatory Districting on the Eve of the 2020 Census, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2093, 2096
(2020) (explaining the elements of a Section 2 violation).
145 Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 547–49.
146 See Karen L. Owen, Georgia: The Rebirth of Two-Party Competition in a Growing, Deep
South State (describing the events leading up the 2020 election), in PRESIDENTIAL SWING
STATES (Rafael Jacob & David Schultz eds., forthcoming 2022); Reid J. Epstein & Astead W.
Herndon, The 10-Year Stacey Abrams Project to Flip Georgia Has Come to Fruition, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/05/us/politics/stacey-abramsgeorgia.html (recognizing Abrams’s decade-long organizing effort to turn Georgia blue).
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Black voting population, a state with significant in-migration from
the North to Atlanta,147 and college educated, suburban White
voters who disliked the incumbent president Donald Trump for,
among other things, his mishandling of the pandemic.148
Consider, first, the racial makeup of Georgia. According to the
2019 Census Bureau American Community Survey population
estimates, Georgia is 57.75% White, 42.25% non-White, and 31.94%
African American.149 Of the eleven states that made up the
Confederacy, no other state has as high a percentage of its
population being non-White, and the only state coming close is
Mississippi with 41.97%.150 The latter, however, does not have as
high a percentage of college educated voters as Georgia. In 2020,
40% of all Georgia voters had a college education, with 12% of voters
being persons of color with a college degree.151 Compare this to
Mississippi where 30% of the voters had college degrees, and 7% of
voters were non-Whites with college degrees.152 In Georgia 61% of
the voters were White,153 whereas in Mississippi, 69% were
White.154 Finally, in Georgia, 69% of White voters supported Trump
and 92% of Black voters supported Biden,155 while in Mississippi,
147 See Abby Budiman & Luis Noe-Bustamante, Black Eligible Voters Have Accounted for
Nearly Half of Georgia Electorate’s Growth Since 2000, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/12/15/black-eligible-voters-have-accounted-fornearly-half-of-georgia-electorates-growth-since-2000/ (stating that migration into Georgia
from other parts of the country was a major source of growth for the state’s Black electorate).
148 See William H. Frey, Biden’s Victory Came from the Suburbs, BROOKINGS (Nov. 13,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/bidens-victory-came-from-the-suburbs/
(discussing the increasing support in Georgia’s suburbs for Democrats).
149 Zoe Manzanetti, State Population by Race, Ethnicity Data, GOVERNING (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.governing.com/now/State-Population-By-Race-Ethnicity-Data.html; cf. also
QuickFacts: Georgia, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/GA (last
visited May 23, 2021) (providing a table of Georgia’s population estimates that states the
2019 total population was 60.2% White).
150 Manzanetti, supra note 149.
151 Georgia
Voter
Surveys:
How
Different
Groups
Voted,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/ap-polls-georgia.html
(last
visited June 22, 2021) [hereinafter Georgia Voter Surveys].
152 Mississippi
Voter
Surveys:
How
Different
Groups
Voted,
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/ap-polls-mississippi.html (last
visited May 23, 2021) [hereinafter Mississippi Voter Surveys].
153 Exit
Polls:
Georgia,
CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exitpolls/president/georgia (last visited May 23, 2021).
154 See Mississippi Voter Surveys, supra note 152.
155 See Georgia Voter Surveys, supra note 151.
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81% of White voters supported Trump and 94% of Black voters
supported Biden.156
This brief comparison shows that while racially polarized voting
exists in both of these states, the presence of more voters with a
college degree somewhat mediated the partisan split in Georgia, but
not as much in Mississippi. Nationally, in 2020, college educated
voters were much more likely to support Biden,157 and Georgia’s
voting patterns followed that trend.158 Yet Georgia’s unique
combination of racial demographics and education distinguished it
from Mississippi and other former Confederate states in setting the
stage for the 2020 election results.
Given this, one should not necessarily expect that Georgia’s
Electoral College vote in 2024 will produce similar results and
protect minority rights. Voter suppression of people of color has not
disappeared in Georgia.159 Except for in Georgia, non-White votes
across the former Confederacy largely did not matter in the 2020
Electoral College. The persistence of racially polarized voting in
2020 does not bode well for 2024. Additionally, following the 2020
election, many states are changing their voting laws in order to
make it harder for people of color to vote,160 including Georgia161 and

See Mississippi Voter Surveys, supra note 152.
See Exit Polls: National Results, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/election/2020/exitpolls/president/national-results (last visited May 23, 2021) (finding a 55% to 43% split in
support for Biden versus Trump among college educated voters).
158 See Georgia Voter Surveys, supra note 151 (showing that 52% of Georgia college
educated voters voted for Biden whereas only 46% voted for Trump).
159 See P.R. Lockhart, The Lawsuit Challenging Georgia’s Entire Elections System,
(May
30,
2019,
5:00
PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-andExplained,
VOX
politics/2018/11/30/18118264/georgia-election-lawsuit-voter-suppression-abrams-kemp-race
(“[T]he Associated Press reported that 53,000 voter registrations, 70 percent of them from
black applicants, were being held by Kemp’s office for failing to clear an ‘exact match’ process
that compares registration information to Social Security and state driver records.”).
160 See Voting Laws Roundup: March 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 1, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-march-2021
(“In a backlash to 2020’s historic voter turnout, . . . state lawmakers have introduced a
startling number of bills to curb the vote. As of March 24, legislators have introduced 361
bills with restrictive provisions in 47 states.”); S.V. Date, Forget Dr. Seuss and Cancel Culture
– The Real GOP Agenda Is Rolling Back Voting, HUFF POST (Mar. 12, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/republicans-voting-restrictions_n_604a76dcc5b6cf72d094e3
7e (“[T]here are already 253 such bills in 43 states and counting.”).
161 See Kevin Morris, Georgia’s Proposed Voting Restrictions Will Harm Black Voters Most,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Mar. 6, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research156
157
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Arizona.162 The U.S. Supreme Court seems prepared to support
these laws,163 and a nearly dismantled VRA will not be able to stop
these changes. Just as racial minorities begin to overcome obstacles
to voting and hurdles presented by the Electoral College, the
proverbial rug may be pulled out from under them. Yet again, as
people of color approach becoming the demographic majority, the
law might adapt to protect a White minority.

VII. CONCLUSION
The Electoral College is an institution born of racism, meant to
entrench anti-majoritarianism, while also suppressing minority
interests. The history of its operation has confirmed this claim.
While the 2020 Georgia general election results suggest that
perhaps the racist legacy of the Electoral College may finally be in
the process of being dismantled, rumors of its death may be greatly
exaggerated.

reports/georgias-proposed-voting-restrictions-will-harm-black-voters-most (describing the
“regressive legislation” proposed by Georgia Republicans).
162 See Timothy Bella, A GOP Lawmaker Says the ‘Quality’ of a Vote Matters. Critics Say
That’s ‘Straight out of Jim Crow,’ WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2021, 12:06 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/03/13/arizona-quality-votes-kavanagh/
(“[T]he Arizona Senate approved a bill that would require voters to submit identification as
part of their mail-in ballots.”).
163 See Leah Litman & Jay Willis, Will the Supreme Court Gut the Voting Rights Act?, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/02/opinion/voting-rights-actsupreme-court.html (warning that “the Supreme Court could open the floodgates to efforts
across the country to restrict the franchise”).
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